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Abstract: Union dissolution is a constantly increasing phenomenon across Europe – even in Italy where the
prevalence of divorce has always been among the lowest. This poses several questions on the consequences which such
an event can have on the families involved. Many studies show that women usually undergo the worst financial
consequences, although there are few analysis on Italy, given the relatively low diffusion of union instability. In this
work we study the impact of separation on the economic well-being of men and women using data from the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP), analysed using both objective and subjective measures. By means of a matching
method, the effect of union dissolution is also estimated considering possible interactions with living arrangements
which ex-partners take after separation. Results confirm that women undergo worse economic distress than men.
However, there is also a significant drop in their economic well-being also among non-custodial fathers who live alone
after separation. In addition, this work suggests that monetary measures of economic well-being should be used with
caution.
1. Introduction and research questions
Compared with literature in other countries, there are only a few studies on the living
conditions of separated and divorced Italians. The reason for this is definitely attributable to the
relatively low level within marriage instability in Italy (ISTAT 2002), which makes the issue less
urgent in terms of public policies.
However, the phenomenon is rapidly growing, considering that from 1995 to 2002 the total divorce
rate passed from 8% to 13.1%; similarly, the total separation rate increased in the same period from
15.8% to 25.7%. We may thus hypothesize that, in the near future the population share of those who
directly (partners) or indirectly (children and partners' original families) undergo these events will
grow significantly.
The diffusion speed of the phenomenon can catch the country unprepared to cope with some of the
problems associated with marital instability.
Generally speaking, family career interruptions introduce complex elements which, if not properly
controlled, can negatively, and sometimes irreversibly, influence people's life course. In this work,
attention focuses on the economic consequences of separation.
Most studies carried out in other countries, well used to coping with the phenomenon, emphasize
that union dissolutions are associated with a fall in economic resources and, generally, with
worsening life-styles leading to forms of impoverishment and economic vulnerability.
Women, in particular, are the weakest actors, especially if they have children to look after (Douglas
and Murch, 2000; Jarvis and Jenkins, 1999; McLanahan et al., 1995; Smock et al., 1999), although
McManus and Di Prete (2001) and Aassve et al. (2006) showed that men also lose economic status
after their union dissolution. Until now, the few empirical analyses considering the Italian situation
seem to agree with the international literature.
In a survey carried out in the early 1990s on legally separated women, 41% of those interviewed
stated that, two years after the separation, their economic condition had worsened with respect to
that during marriage (Barbagli and Saraceno, 1998).
2Comparative data across countries suggest that, in the years immediately after the union dissolution,
Italian women see a deterioration of the household income (Dewilde, 2003; Uunk, 2004; Andreß et
al., 2006). Loss of income may be particularly high for women with responsibility for children after
the split. Bradshaw and Mayhew (2002) estimated that, after separation, lone mothers with pre-
school or school-age children undergo a reduction of net income varying from 54% to 75%,
depending on their working status and on the number and age of children.
However, other comparative analyses showed that the Italian poverty rate among children living
with only one parent (in most cases, the mother) is lower than in Germany or France, and similar to
that of children living in intact families (Del Boca, 2003). A convincing explanation attributes this
result to country differences in the composition of divorced women. In this sense, single Italian
mothers are more protected from poverty because of their higher human capital investment
(education and work) and lower number of children (Del Boca, 2002).
Less clear are the economic consequences of union dissolution on men. Some analyses using
individual data show that Italian men do not suffer economically after separation; on the contrary,
their household income even increases slightly (Andreß et al., 2006). However, the picture change
greatly when we consider the subgroup of parents. According to the estimates of Bradshaw &
Mayhew (2002), non-custodial fathers in any case, lose income compared with their economic
situation before separation, and in some cases the loss may even reach 50%. Aassve et al. (2006)
find that men are unaffected by union dissolution in monetary terms, but if well-being is measured
by non-monetary deprivation, the effect of separation becomes significant and in some cases even
larger than that of women. However, this does not apply to Mediterranean countries, suggesting the
higher propensity of men to return to the parental home.
The present work aimed at investigating this issue in more depth with some innovations. First, we
consider the potential problems of selection bias. Most of the previously cited results were obtained
with descriptive analyses, which compare circumstances before and after separation. Interpretation
must therefore be cautious: the trend observed in the changes of household income before and after
separation may be the same as that non-splitting couples. Moreover, self-selection may severely
bias the true causal relationship between union dissolution and economic consequences. Couples
undergoing a marital split may be qualitatively different from those not doing so in terms of other
background characteristics such as age, education level, employment, income, living arrangements
and social network prior to the event. These differences may affect both the risk of union
dissolution and the economic well-being of partners, so that the real impact of the event may be
biased. In order to tackle all these issues and to isolate the “pure” effect of the separation event, we
use a method - a Difference-in-Differences estimator combined with Propensity Score Matching
techniques (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 1997).
Second, we wished to overcome a problem of measure. The economic consequences of a
partnership dissolution are usually analysed by examining changes in household income.
However, even when net of taxes and adjusted for household composition, household income, may
give a distorted picture of the changes in individuals' economic well-being after separation. Marital
dissolution implies important changes in daily expenditure and these changes differ greatly by
gender. This feature is only partially taken into account by the household income measure. For
example, in the case of dependent children, adjusted household income does take into account in
some crude way the costs of children for the resident parent (usually the mother), but does not
consider at all those of non resident parent (usually the father), like the increased expenses for
alimony, travel to visit the children, or renting new accommodation. Using only household income
to measure the economic consequences of union dissolution may therefore overestimate the
economic well-being of the non-resident father after separation and, consequently, overestimate – at
least for those with children – gender differences in the economic effect of separations.
Therefore, we did not use only the traditional monetary measure (equalized household income) in
our analyses, but also other subjective indicators measuring the living standards and capability of
3households to afford a certain set of expenses. Our hypothesis is that subjective indicators may
reveal negative consequences even though monetary ones do not.
Lastly, we were also interested in studying the interactions between the economic consequences of
separation and the different living conditions after union dissolution. Considering that in Italy
maintaining a separate dwelling may be extremely expensive, we presume that those who, after
separation, share the house with other adults (parents, new partners, friends) have a great
opportunity to save many of housing and housework costs with respect to those who choose (or are
obliged) to live alone or with their children only. In this case, the family of origin, and especially
parents, can provide substantial support to separated men and women, thus alleviating some of the
negative effects of union dissolution. Summarizing, for a comprehensive study of the economic
consequences of union dissolution, living conditions after separation must be investigated more
deeply, extending the simple classification of couples as “with or without children”.
The economic impact of union dissolution in Italy is analyzed using data from the eight waves of
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) carried out in 1994-2001. This source allows
longitudinal analysis, so that we can observe short-term changes. In particular, we aim at analysing
changes in economic status from the year before the break-up to the year after it.
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of the social and institutional
Italian background. Section 3 describes the data and variables used. Sections 4 and 5 present results:
the former gives some descriptive results, and the latter illustrates the model (5.1) and the effects of
union dissolution after having controlled for selection bias (5.2) and interactions with living
arrangements (5.3). Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2. The socio-institutional background
In Italy, the phenomenon of the civil dissolution of marriages has a short history. Until little
more than thirty years ago, only legal separation was possible, and it did not eliminate most of the
civil effects of marriage. Divorce was introduced by law in 1970. A request for divorce could be
made after 5 years of legal separation, and in 1987, a new law reduced this period from 5 to 3 years.
According to Italian legislation therefore - with a few exceptions - legal separation is the necessary
presupposition in order to be able to get a divorce. However, not all legal separations are converted
into a divorce: of the total number of separations granted in 1995, only half (51%) were translated
later into divorce within the year 2002. It should be stressed that, if a couple decides to divorce
consensually, in most part cases the waiting time is short. Of the divorces in 2002, almost half the
cases the time elapsing between legal separation and the request for divorce was 3 years (ISTAT,
2004).
It is not surprising, therefore, that in Italy dissolution of marital unions is much lower than in other
European countries. The legislation has posed (and still poses) several constraints on divorce, and
this indicates that its social acceptance is still relatively low. However, in the last few years legal
separations and divorces have increased sharply (fig.1 ). The total separation rate (x1000), which
was 129 in 1990, 158 in 1995, 228 in 2000 reached 257 in 2002. A similar trend was observed for
the total divorce rate: in the same years, it values (x1000) were respectively 78, 80, 115 and 131 .
Legal separation and especially divorce are not generally events undergone by young people. The
people who separated in 2002 were on average 40 years old (women 39, men 42) and their
marriages had lasted on average 13 years. Most of these couples (69%) had children, and half (52%)
had at least one child under the age of 18, custody of whom after separation was usually granted to
the mothers1. In addition, those who separated had higher human capital than intact couples: in
2002, half (49% men, 53% women) had medium-high education and 70% of the women were
employed.
1 In 2002, after separation, in 85% of cases the custody of children under 18 was granted to mothers, in 4% to
fathers, and 11% to both parents.
4Figure 1: Number of separations and divorces in Italy, 1984-2002. Source: National Statistical
Institute (ISTAT)
What kind of economic problems may these couples experience in the first years after separation,
and what kind of support does Italian society offer them?
It is well-known that the Italian welfare system offers little support to individuals undergoing
economic hardship, and family policies are also rather weak.
At a national level, most resources are destined to social security, education and health. Both the
education and public health systems offer public services (often of good quality) at relatively low
cost; in the case of low family incomes, costs may be further reduced or even cancelled.
Instead, there are few specific services for working mothers. Women can rely on a highly protective
regulation of maternity leave, but after that the system of services for childcare is deficient, and
combined with strict regulation of the labour market, and rigid organisation of everyday life, makes
conciliation between working and maternal roles particularly difficult. Support from families
(especially parents) often compensates for these deficiencies in the welfare system. But, cash
support (to individuals and families) is also quite limited, and the few monetary assignments are
mainly addressed to contrast poverty. There are few benefits for families with children, and they are
limited to low-income and large households. Moreover, the institution of a minimum income is still
at an experimental stage, with many variants, depending on the initiative of local administrations.
Therefore, in Italian society, separated men and women in economic difficulties can count on a
system of public services and access to economic benefits which are means-tested. Access to these
services (e.g., crêches, nursery schools) and benefits is further facilitated for single parent families.
However, for a separated woman, the principal factor of economic security is participation to the
labour market. Considering that, generally, those who have jobs, have full, open-ended contracts,
women who are employed at the moment of separation, are more protected against the risk of
falling into poverty.
Instead, those without a personal income from work risk severe economic difficulties. With legal
separation, solidarity ties do not disappear between the partners: the law obliges the economically
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much on this tool, not only because her husband may not be able, or does not want, to pay the sums
fixed by the judge2, but also because the courts have the tendency to assign only subsistence aims to
this instrument. The statement according to which alimony is granted to a partner in case she/he has
no "suitable personal income or cannot obtain it because of problems of age, health, or young
children needing care" is interpreted in a very restrictive way and, in general, it is sufficient for a
woman to have a job or to be in a position of getting one, not to receive alimony (Barbagli and
Saraceno, 1998)3.
However, judges' sentences do not consider that, in a labour market still relatively rigid and
employee-protective4 like the Italian one, women who have invested in a family - particularly if
they are relatively old and/or have very young children - not only have difficulty in finding
adequately paid jobs, but even in finding any work at all. Summarising, considering the
characteristics of both the labour market and welfare, we must conclude that Italian women who
separate from their partners/husbands without being economically independent risk finding
themselves in serious economic difficulties, and this may perhaps explain the relatively high rate of
participation to labour force among those who undergo a separation.
Finding somewhere to live after the split is a particularly hard problem for both ex-partners. In a
country where house rents on the private market are extremely high, public residential building
plans are relatively few, and the own-property share is about 70%, moving is very expensive, either
renting or purchasing5. In this case, men with young children (living either with them or with the
mother) are the most disadvantaged. If there are dependent children, judges tend to assign the house
in which the couple lived before separation to the custodial parent, independently of who the owner
or tenant is. In 2002, 58% of separation sentences assigned the house where the family lived before
legal separation to the wife, and only in 23% of cases to the husband (the remaining cases are of
couples who decided to leave their house to live in new, independent, and different dwellings). This
is consistent with the fact that women are the custodial parents6 much more frequently than men.
Important help is given to separated people by the family of origin. Although separation is still little
approved by several sectors of society, siblings and especially parents are close to separated people:
they support them psychologically and help them face daily problems, offering goods, services,
money, and hospitality. The help offered by the family of origin is gender-differentiated because
men and women have different needs: women mainly receive money, necessary goods, help in
looking after children (allowing the mothers to work and maintain their economic independence);
men mainly receive hospitality and help with their children (Barbagli and Saraceno, 1998). As in
other circumstances, the strong bonds of the Italian family integrate deficiencies in welfare, thus
attenuating the negative economic consequences of union dissolution.
2 In addition, Italian regulations do not provide fast inexpensive means of constraining reluctant partners to pay
alimony (e. g. there are not forms of direct monetary transfer at source).
3 In 2002, only 24% of separation sentences provided alimony for the separated partner. In the majority of cases (98%)
the man pays and the mean amount is 438 euros.
4 In the last few years the rigidity of the Italian labour market has decreased, but at the risk of a greater job
precariousness. In the future, this may be a further factor of economic distress for women and men.
5 As support of these problems – which also regard the weakest sector of society some local administrations allocate
funds to supplement rent, but this instrument has prevalently charitable purposes and it is not easily accessible to the
separated population. Purchasing a new house is rarely a viable option because the majority of loans at prime rate are
for (young) couples who are married or that have the intention to marry.
6 Women’s advantage does not always remain. With divorce, things change, since 48% of couples leave their family
house for separate, independent dwellings (ISTAT, 2004). According to a 1990 survey (moreover, not representative of
Italian reality) two years after separation, a woman with the custody of children maintains the use of a house only if it is
the property of the woman herself, or of both partners; if the owner is the man or the man’s parents, the use of the house
generally returns to him (Barbagli and Saraceno, 1998).
63. Data and variables
We use data from the ECHP to examine the relationship between union disruption and the
subsequent economic situation. The ECHP is a longitudinal survey on private households,
conducted annually between 1994 and 2001, in 15 EU countries (including Italy).
The survey collected much information on the economic and socio-demographic characteristics of
households and of their members more than 16 years old. Its longitudinal design made it possible to
follow up and interview the same set of people for several consecutive years.
For detailed analysis of the economic consequences of partnership dissolution, it was essential to
use longitudinal data, as we aimed to compare the situation before and after separation. Thus for the
population of interest, we considered information for years t (before dissolution) and t+1 (after
dissolution).
All eight waves of the panel (1994-2001) were examined. One technical issue was the definition of
the event of interest. In theory we could analyze changes in marital status7 ,i. e. the passage from
married to separated state but in practice this is not a viable solution as many people do not report
themselves marital status as separated until when their separation has been legally acknowledged. In
the same way there may be cases of individuals in consensual unions who are registered as married.
This created many problems, and several inconsistencies with this variable and the living
arrangements of separated individuals were found. These inconsistencies inevitably also affected
information on household income (since it was defined as the sum of all personal incomes of all
household members).
An alternative approach – the one used here - combines information on marital status and on
partners' residence: if they stopped living in the same house, (not because of the death of a partner –
we excluded transitions to widowhood), they were deemed to be separated. Thus, a separation is
defined as the end of cohabitation of partners, either in consensual union or in marriage8.
Clearly this choice also has some drawbacks: individuals who do not live together, not because of
separation but for other causes, are considered to be separated (so that living apart together and
commuting marriages may incorrectly be regarded as separations). However, in this way we
defined the event of interest clearly and identified also the moment characterized by the greatest
economic changes.
We restrict our analysis to the population less than 60 years old, to avoid confusing income
changes due to separation and those due to retirement.
In this way, the ECHP provided a sample of 314 cases (55% women) in which we observed a
partnership split (see table 1). The same table also shows some features of individuals undergoing
separation. They are not a young population (on average they are 40) and most of them have
children; the mean duration of the marriage was about 13 years for men and 15 for women. This
should enable us to find similar characteristics of the national data of people who separated in 2002
(see section 2).
The central focus of our analysis was the economic situation of individuals before and after
separation.
ECHP provides rich information on individual (yearly) and household (monthly) incomes, together
with data on many subjective aspects of the economic situation (such as house quality, possession
of durables, arrears, and lifestyle quality). I also provides both objective monetary (income) and
subjective evaluation of the economic situation of households before and after the union dissolution.
There is no other important information related, for example, to the ownership of the house and
personal expenditure.
7 The categories available for marital status were: married, separated, divorced, widowed, never married.
8 For married couples this mainly corresponds to (legal) separation: we focus on separation and not divorce,
because separation is connected to greater economic changes than legal divorce, which follows separation – sometimes
several years later, when the economic situation may already have stabilised (see Andreß and Gullner, 2001, quoted by
Andreß et al., 2006).
7For our analysis, we used data on (equivalised9) total monthly net household income one year
before and one after separation, measured in thousands of lire, that is, the sum of income from
labor, assets, and private and public transfers, net of taxes, for all household members. We assume
that all personal income is shared and that the individual needs of each household member are
adequately satisfied by this income pool. We use here monthly household income (equivalised
according to the OECD scale; see also note ), instead of individual income, because the latter refers
to the year prior to the survey, making it difficult to have information on the year after the split (we
should have the information given 2 years after).
For better understanding of the actual impact of separation, we also consider some subjective data:
income is only a monetary measure of economic well-being, and considering the effect of
separation only on it, is a limited approach, as other aspects of economic well-being (e. g. life-style
and house quality) are disregarded. We therefore also considered some indicators measuring
perception of income variations compared to the previous year, living standard, the capability of the
household to face a set of costs (like those related to the house and to some payments; see also note
10) and savings.
In addition, we considered labor market transitions, expecting that individuals, usually women
without jobs, are looking for a source of personal income after separation. In fact (see again table
1), the percentage of women working is about 60% (but about 90% for men), and mean individual
incomes are higher for men; the percentage of women without individual incomes is higher than
that for men. After separation, some women probably need a new source of income.
Table 1 Characteristics of individuals before union dissolution by gender.
ITALY
MEN WOMEN
Total no. separations 142 172
N° of marital dissolutions 120 147
% non marital dissolutions 15.5% 14.5%
% couples with children 66.9% 75.0%
% living with parents 8.5% 4.7%
% working 88.7% 59.3%
Mean age 41.0 38.7
Mean age of youngest child 10.5 11.5
Mean duration of marriage 12.9 14.6
Mean duration of cohabitation 4.5 5.5
% without individual income 5.6 18.0
Mean personal yearly income (in thousands of lire)* 27,180.5 22,401.1
* Incomes are reported using the national currencies in ECHP.
Then we consider transitions in living arrangements (tables 2a and 2b) of men and women who
underwent a separation. Definition of living arrangement here is made differentiating between
couples with other adults (parents or siblings, excluding adult children) and couples without other
adults. Most separated individuals (83% of men, 85% of women) had lived with their families
without other adults before separation. The majority of them had children.
After separation there is a dramatic change of living arragements of ex-partners, and that change
highly depends on the presence of children. When there are not children the routes taken by men
and women after separation are quite similar: most of them live alone whereas about 17% return to
9 Several equivalence scales are used in the literature to control for economies of scale and varying income
needs (for an overview, see Buhmann et al., 1988), but a common standard has not yet been found. We used a scale that
adjusts all household incomes with respect to the number of adults and minors (according to the modified OECD scale)
in the household. Adults and minors in the household are given different weights: 1 is given to reference person, 0.7 to
other adults in the household, and 0.5 to minors aged 14 or less.
8parents' home. Instead, when there are children, we see a very great gender difference: there are
about 23% of single-parent men, but the figure for women reaches 85%. This means that after
separation on the whole only 15% of men live as single-aprents, 26% returnto their parents' home,
but the majority live alone. About 60% of women live with their children (as single parents), 25%
live alone and fewer than 10% return to their parents. In both cases (especially for men), fewer than
5% form new couples.
Thus gender has a great impact on where individuals live after separation: men are more likely to
return home or to form a single household than women, who are more likely to form single-parent
families.
Table 2a Living arrangements transitions of men who underwent a separation.
After separation Without others With others (with or
without children)
Before separation
Alone With
children
With a new
partner With parents
Number of
cases (=100)
Without others
Couple 81,08 2,70 0,00 16,22 37
Couple with children 51,85 23,46 1,23 23,46 81
With others
Couple 40,00 10,00 0,00 50,00 10
Couple with children 21,43 7,14 21,43 50,00 14
Total 79 22 4 37 142
Table 2b Living arrangement transitions of women who underwent a separation.
After separation Without others With others (with or
without children)
Before separation Alone
With
children
With a new
partner With parents
Number of
cases (=100)
Without others
Couple 71,43 5,71 5,71 17,14 35
Couple with children 12,61 85,59 0,90 0,90 111
With others
Couple 37,50 0,00 37,50 25,00 8
Couple with children 5,56 38,89 22,22 33,33 18
Total 43 104 10 15 172
4. Descriptive results
A preliminary descriptive analysis, based on the eight waves of the ECHP suggests that
gender has a strong impact on the economic situation of individuals after separation. As presumed
above and as found in the literature, separation makes the situation worse for women. Table 3 does
show that household monthly incomes increase after separation for men, and decrease for women.
Subjective data are clearly consistent with financial data for women: the income situation compared
with the previous year deteriorates remarkably after separation and the ability to make ends meet is
also clearly worse. In addition, women have more difficulties in affording several home-related
costs (e. g. heating and furniture) and some payments (scheduled rent). The ability to maintain a
living standard decreases and the percentage of women who are left with some money for savings
decreases much more than that of men. As regards the working situation, women undergo an
increase in the participation rate after separation.
9Although for men the monthly household income increases considerably after separation, some
subjective indicators show a different picture. Like women (although to a lesser extent), they report
a deterioration in income situation after separation, find difficulty in maintaining their standard of
living, and affording some types of expenditures.
Table 3. Economic situation one year before and one year after separation.
Male Female
Before After Before After
Total monthly net household income (eq., Italian lire x 1000) 1788,9 2274,7 1625,3 1391,6
Income situation compared with previous year:
- deteriorated 36,3 45,8 30,8 54,6
Ability to make ends meet:
- with difficulty 55,6 52,1 61,1 71,5
Ability to afford payments related to life-style10 0,69 0,75 0,78 0,89
The household can afford:
keeping its home adequately warm 83,1 82,4 82,5 78,4
replacing any worn-out furniture 45,8 42,3 42,7 33,9
The household has been unable to pay:
scheduled rent for accommodation 2,8 3,5 2,3 3,5
scheduled mortgage payments 1,4 0,0 1,7 0,0
scheduled utility bills (electricity, water, gas) 7,7 5,6 8,2 8,1
hire-purchase installments or other loan repayments 4,9 1,4 4,7 2,9
Some money left to savings 31,7 28,6 32,6 19,8
% working 88,7 86,6 59,3 62,9
5. Modeling the economic consequences of union dissolution
5.1. Causal analysis
Although the above descriptive analysis offers many indications on the association between
separation and the subsequent changes in life-style, it does not suffice to identify the causal relation
between the two processes. The differences between those who undergo separation and those who
do not may be influenced by the different background characteristics of the two groups. For
instance, we may expect that couples undergoing separation have a different level of well-being
prior to separation with respect to that of other couples. Generally speaking, the two groups may be
qualitatively different in terms of many background variables, and we need to control for these
variables if we aim at identifying the causal effect of separation from the spurious dependence
brought about by these variables.
More than one solution is possible for this identification of causal effect. One is to use an
instrumental variable (Angrist, 1998), which allows us to simulate a random assignment of
treatment (in our case, the treatment is the point of separation). In observational studies, treatment is
not randomly assigned, but there may be an exogenous variable correlated with treatment. For
example, Angrist and Evans (1998) used same-sex children as an instrument to estimate the effect
of fertility on parents' labor supply. However, finding such a variable is extremely difficult, as
highlighted by Heckman et al. (1999).
A different route was proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) by assuming that we record all
variables X that confound the effect of treatment on outcome. This may be identified by making the
estimate conditional on X. A dimensionality problem arises when the number of possible
10 This measure considers some aspects related to life-style: the ability to pay for a week's annual holiday away from
home, to buy new, rather than second-hand, clothes, eat meat, chicken or fish, if desired, every second day, have
friends or family for drinks or meals at least once a month. The value reported represents the mean of values of these
four aspects: 1 if the household cannot afford that cost, and 0 otherwise. It varies from 0 to 1, and an increasing value
means a worsening of the situation. We constructed this composite indicator to summarise indexes related to the some
topic.
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confounder variables is higher than 5, but the above authors showed that it is possible to condition
on the propensity score, instead of X, i. e. the probability of undergoing the event conditional on the
value of X, easily estimated by means of a probit or logit regression model.
Given the relative richness of information of the ECHP data and the problems of finding a proper
instrumental variable, we use propensity score matching to isolate the causal effect of separation.
Therefore, we assume that we observe all the confounding variables in our dataset – an assumption
commonly referred to as the conditional independence assumption (CIA), ruling out the effect of
unobserved heterogeneity. However, the fact that the CIA is quite unlikely to hold, even if we have
a rich dataset cannot be neglected. One way to relax the CIA is to combine a Difference-in-
Differences estimator with the matching procedure (Heckman et al. 1998). Basically, we estimate
the effect of treatment on the prime difference of outcome in two subsequent years. Thus, for
treated individuals we have the difference between outcome one year after treatment and one year
before, whereas for controls (i. e., non-treated individuals), we only have just the difference
between two consecutive years. In practice, this is a fixed-effect estimator, and if unobserved
heterogeneity is time-invariant, its effect is netted out by the Difference-in-Differences estimator.
Therefore, the CIA is a milder assumption imposed on our inference framework.
There are many matching methods (see Becker and Ichino, 2002; and Smith and Todd, 2005, for a
list). In this paper we use a nearest-neighbor method in which every treated individual is matched to
the closest control, closeness being determined by the distance of the propensity scores.
Table 4 shows the results of the logit model used to estimate the propensity scores.
Table 4. Logit model on probability of undergoing separation
MEN WOMEN
Estimate Std.Error Estimate Std.Error
Intercept -6,671 1,384 *** -4,620 1,329 ***
Year 1995 (Ref. 1994) 0,459 0,350 0,233 0,309
Year 1996 (Ref. 1994) 0,698 0,338 ** 0,401 0,303
Year 1997 (Ref. 1994) 0,741 0,339 ** 0,692 0,292**
Year 1998 (Ref. 1994) 0,263 0,371 0,343 0,312
Year 1999 (Ref. 1994) 0,115 0,386 0,113 0,331
Year 2000 (Ref. 1994) 0,245 0,387 -0,002 0,350
Cohabiting union (Ref. Marriage) 1,964 0,253*** 1,966 0,235***
Age -0,015 0,010 -0,020 0,009**
Education: medium (Ref. low) 0,146 0,198 0,289 0,177
Education: high (Ref. low) 0,948 0,255*** 0,091 0,309
In paid employment (Ref. not working) -0,031 0,308 0,192 0,246
Self Employed (Ref. not working) 0,316 0,304 0,196 0,287
Personal income (log) -0,094 0,034 *** 0,044 0,026*
Household Income (log) 0,310 0,189 -0,080 0,183
North (Ref. South) 0,125 0,225 0,209 0,206
Centre (Ref. South) 0,413 0,226* 0,388 0,209*
Number of children -0,278 0,099*** -0,033 0,085
Parents living with household 0,428 0,194** 0,400 0,252
Signif. codes: `***' 0.01 `**' 0.05 `*' 0.1
We included here wave, age, gender, regional location, education, employment status, type of
union, number of children, whether the individual was living with parent or not before separation,
and personal and household income. We also included the value of outcome before treatment: as we
estimate the impact of separation on several outcomes, specification of the logit model changes
accordingly.
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The results of our logit model are in line with the literature. The propensity to separation decreases
with age, but its effect is significant only for men. Cohabiting unions are more prone to dissolution,
and a high educational level is also positively associated with this risk. Again, this effect is
significant only for men. Interestingly, personal income has a different impact according to gender:
for men the higher the income, the lower the propensity to union dissolution, and the opposite for
women. Having children a protective function against separation although this is only evident for
men. People living in the south of Italy are less likely to separate. Lastly, if men live with their
parents, the probability of union dissolution increases.
Therefore, the following estimates were computed net of these variables. Note that, in this
framework, the correct specification of the logit model is not a problem: this method is basically a
non-parametric one, so we do not need to specify the correct functional form of the relation between
treatment and covariates (see Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005).
5.2. Results
The results of table 5 must be interpreted bearing in mind the Difference-in-Differences estimator.
This means that the table shows the difference between the average changes in outcome of treated
and in outcome of controls. For example, the estimate –386.23 for women's total monthly
household income means that the difference between income before and after separation is
averagely lower by 386.23 thousand of lire than the average income change of controls.
Table 5. Effects of separation on several outcomes11. Estimates with propensity score matching (1
neighbour, 1000 replications).
Men Women
Effect St. Err. t-value N Effect St. Err. t-value N
Total monthly net household income 453,43 171,531*** 142 -368,23 110,734*** 172
Income situation compared with previous year[1] 0,155 0,132 142 0,413 0,126*** 172
Ability to make ends meet -0,113 0,146 142 -0,430 0,131*** 172
Ability to afford payments related to life-style 0,155 0,132 142 0,036 0,117 170
Ability to keep home adequately warm 0,063 0,048 142 0,018 0,045 170
Inability to pay scheduled rent -0,021 0,024 141 -0,023 0,023 171
Inability to pay scheduled mortgage payments 0,014 0,017 142 -0,012 0,016 171
Inability to pay scheduled utility bills -0,007 0,036 142 -0,029 0,035 171
Inability to pay loan repayments 0,007 0,029 142 0,000 0,027 171
Some money left for savings (+=worse) -0,029 0,065 140 0,145 0,060** 172
Exit from the labour market (workers only) 0,008 0,031 126 -0,039 0,046 102
Entry into the labour market (inactives only) 0,063 0,204 16 0,114 0,067* 70
Weekly working hours (workers only) 0,588 1,260 114 1,926 1,196 94
Signif. codes: `***' 0.01 `**' 0.05 `*' 0.1
[1] The variable is coded a five-point scale: the highest values means “clearly deteriorated” and the lowest
“clearly improved”. Therefore a positive value associated to this item means a worsening of household income
situation, due to separation.
Bearing this in mind, the results basically confirm the findings of descriptive analysis12: the
income situation of women is highly likely to worsen after separation, more than that of men. The
11 In the model a positive value for the outcome related to ability means worsening of the situation; conversely, a
positive value for inability means improvement.
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latter may even be better off after separation, as their equivalent monthly household income is
significantly higher, whereas women's incomes drop significantly after separation.
This is confirmed by the subjective perception of economic status: for women, there is a significant
drop in the ability to make ends meet due to separation, and they report a worsened income situation
compared with the previous year. This is also witnessed by the effect of separation on transitions in
the labor market. Women out of the labor market are more likely to enter the labor force after
separation, suggesting that some of them are trying to cope with the economic shock.
5.3. Influence of living arrangements after union dissolution
In the next step, we study in detail the effect of the interactions between union dissolution
and living arrangement after separation. Table 2 shows that men, especially if they have children,
are more likely to return to their parental home after union dissolution, which may explain why they
do not suffer so much economically. The presence of children greatly influences home assignment
to women: mothers are highly likely to remain in the same house after conjugal separation, and
fathers are highly likely to leave. This may be an advantage for women in terms of housing quality
but a disadvantage in terms of income, as they need to share income with other non-productive
family members. Conversely, men are likely to be forced to leave the conjugal home and find a new
accommodation, and the increased expense for the new dwelling may offset economic advantages
in terms of income (unless they return to their parental home). So we examined how the economic
effect of separation interacts with living arrangements after the union dissolution13.
We replicated the above analysis on a particular subgroup considering only men and women with
children: we estimated the impact of union dissolution combined with subsequent living
arrangements. We considered a specific subgroup of parents and therefore excluded all unions
without children. For men “treatment” consists of undergoing separation and subsequently living
alone, for women, we define “treatment” as undergoing separation and becoming a single-parent the
following year. In this way, we identify what we expect to be the most common living arrangement
adopted by fathers and mothers after separation. Non-custodial fathers are also usually obliged to
leave the conjugal home, which is assigned to custodial mothers, and to pay alimony for their
children, so they are probably the subgroup of men undergoing the most difficult economic
situation. Similarly, custodial mothers are also likely to undergo the worst-case scenario among
separated women: they must share their income with their children, and the alimony they receive
rarely compensates the increased expenses. If the above arguments are true, estimations of marital
dissolution effects on these particular subgroups should reflect this, and they may also show a
significant negative impact of union dissolution for non-custodial fathers, and, for custodial
mothers, an even worse scenario than what emerges from table 5.
The estimates reported in table 6 basically meet our expectations: despite their increased income,
separated men reports a significantly more deteriorated income situation than the control group.
They also have more problems with paying utility bills, and the index of life-style conditions is
12 We use the following pre-treatment variables to specify propensity score estimation model: wave, age,
education level, employment status, personal and household income, number of children, presence of parents in the
household, type of union (marital or consensual) and region.
13 The choice of living arrangement may be endogenous with the effect of union dissolution on economic well-
being. For instance, it may be argued that choice of living arrangements after separation is, at least partially, driven by
the economic situation. However, we may reasonably assume, on the basis of the relatively high social acceptance of
co-residence with parents even at 30+ ages, that choice of living arrangements in Italy is actually driven by the
possibility of moving to parental home: if men can go back to their parents, they will probably do so, regardless of their
economic situation, thus avoiding a difficult search for a new dwelling. If they cannot, then they have little choice, as
alternatives to moving into a single-person household after union dissolution are rare in Italy. Women with children are
somehow forced to remain in the conjugal home they are assigned, if they want to keep it. So they are very unlikely to
move to their parental home, regardless of their economic situation. On the basis of these arguments, we are confident
that living arrangement taken after union dissolution are poorly related with economic well-being of spouses.
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significantly lower. However, the situation of separated women is still worse, and there is also a
significant effect of treatment on perceptions of the ability to make ends meet, to keep the house
adequately warm, and to save money during the year. In addition, we still find an effect on labor
market entry rate – separated women being more likely to enter the job market than the control
group. Therefore, excluding men returning to their parents' home after separation we find a
significant impact of union dissolution on men's well-being, or at least on their subjective
perception of the quality of their life-style. This is also confirmed by conducting the same analysis
but considering only fathers returning to the parental home (results not shown): for this group, the
effect of the union split is negligible.
Table 6. Effects of separation on several outcomes. Estimates with propensity score matching (1
neighbor, 500 replications).
Men Women
Effect St. Err. N Effect St. Err. N
Total monthly net household income 1157,4 415,12*** 45 -317,52 166,872* 102
Income situation compared with previous year[1] -0,441 0,170** 45 -0,530 0,127*** 102
Ability to make ends meet -0,089 0,263 45 -0,451 0,172** 102
Ability to afford payments related to life-style -0,467 0,235* 45 -0,337 0,156** 101
Ability to keep home adequately warm -0,057 0,056 45 -0,085 0,046* 102
Inability to pay scheduled rent 0,044 0,045 45 0,039 0,030 102
Inability to pay scheduled mortgage payments -0,022 0,018 45 -0,010 0,022 102
Inability to pay scheduled utility bills -0,060 0,030** 45 -0,046 0,033 102
Inability to pay loan repayment -0,044 0,058 45 -0,020 0,033 102
Some money left for savings (+=worse) -0,106 0,082 44 -0,161 0,054*** 102
Exit from the job market (workers only) 0,004 0,025 38 0,012 0,039 57
Entry in the job market (inactives only) - - - - 0,100 0,053* 45
Signif. codes: `***' 0.01 `**' 0.05 `*' 0.1
[1] The variable is coded a five-point scale: the highest values means “clearly deteriorated” and the lowest
“clearly improved”. Therefore a positive value associated to this item means a worsening of household income
situation, due to separation.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this work was to provide an initial comprehensive, robust assessment of the
economic impact of union dissolution in Italy, considering that until now – partly because of its low
frequency – few empirical data were available to study the phenomenon.
Our analyses, carried out on data representative at a national level and using methods that take into
account possible disturbing factors, indicate that union dissolution in Italy produces differentiated
economic effects for men and women, at least in the short term.
Even after controlling for several conditions preceding separation, women find themselves in a
weaker position than men. Monetary and subjective measures of economic well-being both indicate
a worsening of women's status in the year after separation with respect to the last year of union.
This happens even though union dissolution forced some of them to increase their personal income
by taking a job after the event. Single mothers in particular suffer the heaviest penalties in living
standards. Separation has mixed effects among men, suggesting that here the event may produce
different economic consequences according to the subsequent living conditions. In general, men do
not undergo negative economic consequences after separation but when our analysis is concentrated
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on non-custodial fathers living alone, we find that men too may experience a decrease in their
standard of living, even though their household income increases. The scarcity of cases does not
allow deeper analysis on this point (models for all subgroups of separated men and women,
classified according to the different living arrangements after separation, could not be run), but the
results reported here empirically support our hypothesis: the better economic position of Italian men
depend on two factors: personal income, and the opportunity, provided by the strong family
network of returning – at least in the first period after separation - to their parental home.
Two other important and more general results of this study must be stressed. First, household
income, even when equivalised and net of taxes must be used with caution as a proxy of changes in
economic well-being for separated people. The present empirical analysis demonstrates that
individuals may suffer statistically significant economic penalties in their living standards, even
with a significant increase in equivalised household income.
Second, separation may have opposite economic consequences in different subgroups of separated
people, and that they do not depend only on the conditions preceding separation, but also on those
subsequent to the event. Considering that, at least for those who are parents, post-separation living
arrangements are gender differentiated, this work indicates that a correct interpretation of the gender
differences in the economic impact of union dissolution should take into account the living
arrangements after separation of both men and women. The same result also indicates caution in
interpreting the effects of union dissolution across different countries. Indeed, results may be
influenced by country-differences in the distributions of living arrangements after separation.
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